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ABSTRACT 
The literature on pension reform is increasingly growing examining different aspects of pension matters 
including but not limited to the nature, types of classifications, effects, challenges and prospects of pension 
reforms. The importance of pension reforms is credited to its potential to guarantee a sustainable pension scheme 
that provides with a decent life to pensioners and their dependents. This research gives a detailed analysis on 
pension reform theories such as economic theory, multi-pillar model by the World Bank, theory of utility and 
preferences and life cycle theories. It further discusses the three retirement decision models: two-thirds 
retirement decision model, the option value retirement decision model and one-year retirement decision model 
used in explaining various decisions relating to retirement and also the forms of retirement benefits payments. 
Finally, it discusses the four approaches by which pension reforms can be analyzed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Pension reforms are key to place proper economic incentives so that they improve compliance with obligations, 
reduce labor market distortions, increase savings and accelerate financial market development (Idowu, 2006). A 
pension reform despite the original high cost should be considered as an investment which will yield returns of 
investment (Imhanlahimi and Idolor, 2011). In addition, an adequate pension reform can allow the pensioner to 
continue being a useful member of his/her community. Further to this, a pension reform is of importance since it 
has been proved that it leads to structural reform, for instance in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) with 
establishment of new structures that remove the burden of pension administration from the governments.  
Another reason for pursuing a pension reform is how pension reform can guarantee the financial durability of the 
pension system (Imhanlahimi and Idolor, 2011). A synthesis of the literature and theories explored suggest that 
there is the issue of acceptance of a particular pension scheme to the workforce for the sustainability of the 
scheme. Once that is achieved, certain key features of a good pension design include as Fornero (2013) 
summarizes it: good diversification of risks (i.e. a mixed pension provision, partly public and PAYGO and partly 
private and funded), Good correlation, at the individual level, between contributions and benefits to enhance the 
“saving” role of a pension scheme, direct correlation of benefits to the age of retirement (actuarial principle), no 
“implicit taxation” of pension wealth with the postponement of retirement, uniformity of rules, with limited and 
transparent exceptions, a balanced combination of mandates and choices (responsibilities) and financial literacy 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Pension Reform Theories: 
This section addresses on the following: economic theory and its implications for policymaking, the multi-pillar 
model by the World Bank, the theory of utility and preference and life cycle theories of pension. 
 
Economic Theory and Implications for policy 
Focusing on economic principles, it is possible according to Barr and Diamond (2009; 2010) to frame policy 
design for pension reform based on certain conclusions. First, the analysis and design should consider the 
pension system as a whole. Pension design affects the labor market, economic growth, the distribution of risk, 
and the distribution of income, including effects by gender and generation. It is significant not to design one part 
of the system, since there can be no gain from an actuarial second-tier pension drawing on the need to relief 
poverty in the first-tier Barr and Diamond (2010). The analysis should focus on the combined effect of the 
system as a whole which can be pursued by simultaneously considering the parts of the pension system Barr and 
Diamond (2010). 
Secondly, the economic crisis has provided with some key lessons that should drive pension reform. The most 
important is perhaps before embarking in the design of a reform to explicitly ask how risk should be shared. In 
pure funded individual accounts, all of the risks fall on the worker, which is unbearable for some people. One 
proposition would be to distribute the risk by buttressing individual accounts with a tax-financed 
noncontributory pension. 
As a country’s economic and administrative capacity grows, there are pension system options available. In 
general, it is important to remember that pension systems have multiple objectives; different pension systems 
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share risks differently, both across people and over time; there is no single best pension system; pensions should 
be analyzed in a second-best context, that is, taking account of market imperfections and other distortions; and a 
move to funding may or may not be the right policy (Barr and Diamond, 2010). 
Multi-Pillar Pension Model 
There exist two perspectives in regards to policy debate on pension reforms: The Anglo America perspective and 
the more “old school” European welfarist perspective (Baroni, 2007). In this subsection, the focus is not the 
Multi-pillar approach or Model introduced by the World Bank which falls within the Anglo-American 
perspective. The latter perspective emphasizes on the normative approach that private funded supplementary 
pension arrangements should dominate over public provision. The underlying rationale behind the Anglo-
American approach is an obvious critique of PAYG systems (Baroni, 2007). Minns (2001) provides with a useful 
summary of the core-shared claims of proponents of the Anglo-American model:  
1. Pay As You Go (PAYG) are undermined by demographic changes, i.e. increasing dependency 
ratios.  
2. The present value of state pension benefits to be paid between now and 2030 exceed the 
present value of expected contributions by two or three times the present value of GDP for most OECD 
countries, hence taxation will have to increase.  
3. State expenditure on pensions is high, at 12-15 percent of GDP in most European countries.  
4. The State is unreliable in keeping its promises, while crowding out private savings for 
retirement.  
5. The private sector appears better at creating and using savings for increasing   investments and 
thus the growth required for increasing pension claims.  
The Anglo-American approach essentially strongly suggests moving away from a redistributive emphasis and 
encouraging insurance and personal savings instead to address the aging challenge. The proposition is therefore 
that the explicit focus of future social security systems should be in savings and work, mainly by shifting from 
defined benefits to defined contributions systems (Baroni, 2007).  
The objective of the Multi-pillar policy framework based on the above understanding of the Anglo-American 
approach entails a shift towards a more general reform to a country´s pension system as a whole (i.e. involving a 
strategy to reform simultaneously its public, private and occupational systems). This is important to this research 
as such a move is more likely to take place in developing countries such as India, which are building a system 
from scratch (Baroni, 2007). 
According to Baroni (2007) crucial elements in a pension reform include as shown in Figure 3, the Degree of 
Actuarial Fairness, Benefit Type and Degree of Private Funding. 
 
Figure 1: Types of Pension Reforms in the Policy debate. Source: Baroni, 2007. 
Source: Baroni, E. 2007 
A Multi-pillar system (i.e. something which includes both a Type I, or a Type II, and a Type IV system) focuses 
on what is perceived as the most crucial topic in the policy debate which is the extent of funding and whether 
funding should be the best financing mechanism for the public system (Baroni, 2007). The Multi Pillar approach, 
is considered as a structural approach to pension reform which is in contrast to other strategies like parametric 
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approaches to reform where unfunded pension systems are “corrected” through policies changing some of their 
existing parameters, e.g. raising the retirement age, reducing the value of the benefit offered. However, the focus 
here is on the Multi-pillar approach to reform since, despite the strong influence from the funding perspective, it 
allows for a combination of both structural and parametric approaches to reform. 
Following this line of thinking, in terms of the graph that captures key reform alternatives in the policy debates 
(Figure 2.2) proposed by Baroni (2007), the Multi-pillar model essentially would entail a shift from any pension 
system type to a system of type IV. If the country does not hold a pension system, type IV could function as a 
blueprint for setting up the “optimal” system. The Multi-pillar model is made of three parallel “pillars”: namely a 
small mandatory, publicly managed (unfunded) defined benefit PAYG scheme (first tier), a substantial 
mandatory privately managed (funded) defined contribution scheme (second tier), and a voluntary private funded 
scheme (third tier). The World Bank has added a new “zero tier” in its 2005 report, aimed to work as a non-
contributory minimum pension for the very poor and those with no working history. Still, this latest addition 
should be considered an integral part of the public “first tier” (Baroni, 2007). 
Various organizations have proposed what each of the three tiers as proposed by the multi pillar model should be 
composed of. The three tier propositions of the OECD as applied by the European Union (EU), World Bank and 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) are as described in Table 2.1 below. 
 
Table 1 The three tier propositions of the OECD as applied by the European Union (EU), World Bank and 
the International Labour Organization (ILO).  
Adapted From: World Bank (1994); Gillion (1999) & Yermo (2002) 
 
 Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation 
and Development (the EU) 
 
The World Bank International Labour 
Organization(ILO) 
 
1ST 
pillar 
Publicly managed pension 
scheme with defined 
benefits and PAYG finance, 
usually a payroll tax. 
A relatively small (means 
tested, minimum pension 
guarantee or flat benefit), 
publicly managed, PAYG, 
defined benefit pillar. 
A minimum anti-poverty pension, 
universally available but means 
tested, financed possibly directly 
from general revenues and indexed 
 
 
2ND 
pillar 
Privately managed pension 
which are provided as part of 
an employment contract. 
A privately managed (personal 
savings plan or occupational 
plan), mandatory, regulated 
fully funded, defined 
contribution, pillar. 
A mandatory public PAYG social 
insurance pension which would 
provide a reasonable replacement 
rate. It would be fully indexed 
against inflation. In addition, it 
would be subject to a ceiling. 
 
 
3RD 
Pillar 
Personal pension plan in the 
form of saving and annuity 
schemes. 
Voluntary, individual account 
(personal savings plan or 
occupational plan), privately 
managed. 
A fully funded contribution 
scheme, perhaps privately 
managed, which would supplement 
the public scheme. This would 
include occupational as well as 
individual schemes. Their operation 
would need to be closely monitored 
and regulated. 
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Figure 2: Taxonomy: Different types of retirement-income provision (OECD , 2015). 
Source: OECD 2015 
 
1
ST
 Pillar Propositions: 
Under the 1
st
 pillar, the OECD proposes that the pillar should be composed of a pension scheme that is publicly 
managed and is based on the Defined Benefit framework. The DB public pension system according to the OECD 
should be under the PAYG framework with a designated payroll tax used to meet the pension liabilities and 
obligation when they fall due. The payroll tax revenue established by the government used to pay the pension 
benefits under the tier 1 (Yermo, 2002). The World Bank on the other hand proposes that Tier 1 should be 
composed of a relatively small pension mean tested pension scheme with a flat rate benefit.  
The first pillar is also based on the Defined benefit framework similar to the OECD proposition but the main 
difference under the World Bank framework is that the 1
st
 pillar is constituted of a relatively smaller pension 
scheme as opposed to the large public scheme under the OECD framework (World Bank, 1994). The 
International Labor Organization (ILO) on the other hand takes a slightly different approach for the 1st Tier in the 
pension system. The ILO proposes that the 1
st
 pillar should be composed of a pension that is geared towards 
poverty alleviation for the retired. The ILO proposed that the minimum anti-poverty geared pension should be 
available to all in the population. The pension benefit in under this 1
st
 pillar should not be just a flat rate but a flat 
rate that has been mean tested to ensure equitability. 
The ILO proposes that the anti-poverty pension benefit should not be financed from a particular payroll tax 
revenue set up by the government but rather from the general revenue that has been generated by the government. 
From the first pillar, we can see that the difference in the three proposals is in terms of the size of the pension 
scheme, the funding mechanism and the benefit payment framework. 
 
2
ND
 Pillar Propositions: 
Under the second Pillar the OECD proposes that the Pillar should be constituted of employer provided privately 
managed pension schemes. Under the second pillar OECD proposes that there should be well-structured 
privately managed employer pension schemes that are provided by the employers as part of the employment 
package. Under the OECD proposal the both the employer and the employee should make contributions to the 
pension fund at an agreed rate. The contributions in the privately managed pension scheme are based on the 
employee’s earnings and the funds are managed by a private pension investment fund selected by the employer. 
Under the World Bank proposal, the second pillar should be composed of a privately managed pension scheme 
that is a form of personal retirement saving. The pension schemes under the second pillar can also be a form of 
occupational retirement plan. Under the World Bank proposal, the membership in the second pillar should be 
made mandatory for all the employed and the other willing unemployed persons. The World Bank proposed that 
the pension schemes in the second pillar also need to be fully funded and based on the Defined Contributions 
framework. 
The ILO on the other hand proposes that the second pillar should be composed of a PAYG social based insurance 
pension that will ensure that the retired get a reasonable rate for their employment income when they retire. The 
ILO proposed that the pension scheme should have full indexation and this will ensure that all the inflationary 
effects are factored into the pension benefits calculations. The ILO proposed that the pension benefit that is paid 
should have both a lower and an upper ceiling whereby the pension benefits are payable up to a defined 
maximum amount. 
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3
RD
  Pillar Propositions: 
Under the OECD proposition the 3
rd
 pillar should be composed of personal pension schemes. Under the third 
pillar the personal pension plans is composed of two major components that include the personal savings 
schemes and the annuity based personal plans that allow the individuals to earn annuity payments on retirement. 
The personal savings can also be withdrawn before retirement by the contributors for various reasons. The 
savings under the savings pension plans enable contributions towards savings for various purpose that include 
retirement savings, purchase of asset and other future expenditures. 
The World Bank proposes that the third pillar should be composed of personal saving plans that have the 
following features; the schemes should be voluntary in nature thereby allowing the contributors to contribute any 
amount that they wish to contribute and there is segregation of the contributions into individual accounts. The 
schemes are also privately managed by privately owned pension management companies and there is much more 
flexibility in the pension management. 
The ILO proposes that the third pillar should be composed of fully funded pension schemes that are privately 
managed. The privately managed schemes perform the role of complementing the public schemes and include 
both the individual and the occupational based pension schemes. ILO also notes that though the schemes are 
privately managed there should be close monitoring and regulations for the scheme to avoid fraud and to protect 
the member’s rights. 
Theory of utility and preference. 
The theory of utility and preference acknowledges how it is not always possible to sustain all data needed in 
monetary terms for developing alternative decision-making. In this sense, some decisions can be taken partly on 
subjective valuation. In such a perspective, a high risk, untested decision is not assured since it does not enjoy 
consumer or user or beneficiary acceptance (Imhanlahimi and Idolor, 2011). Nevertheless, preference should be 
given to the high-risk decision in which utility, determined as inherent quality or value, is more assured to be 
constantly occurring rather than the low risk decision where utility is not assured. 
Life Cycle Theory 
The theory of Life Cycle relates to consumption pattern and saving decision of the individual and is mainly 
based on Modigliani and Brumberg cited in Idowu (2006). Consumption according to this model is a function 
that a person undertakes through a lifetime of wealth whether it is financial, real assets and expected value of 
future income. The pattern of income does not affect the pattern of consumption according to this theory except 
in the exception of pension reform plan (Imhanlahimi and Idolor, 2011). In this case, the pension reform plan can 
influence the wealth of a future pensioner. The theory suggests that pension reform can affect saving rate of the 
participant in a pension plan by affecting the average wealth gained.  
The latter results from the fact that a sustainable pension plan lead to great financial resources for further 
investment earnings that could lead to a significant redistribution of income, and therefore increased wealth to 
pension contributors. In effect, the previous can encourage increased or sustainable saving propensity 
(Imhanlahimi and Idolor, 2011). Conclusively, it can be said that the pension reform can potentially change or 
affect the life cycle. It should be noted though that this theory can be influenced by economic depression such as 
economic recession and management. 
OTHER PENSION REFORM MODELS: 
Retirement Decision Models 
There exist three retirement decision models that can be used to explain the various decisions relating to 
retirement. The three models that we will look at include; Two-thirds retirement model, Option-value model and 
One-year retirement model (MacDonald & Cairns, 2010). 
(a) Two thirds retirement Decision model: 
The two-thirds model proposes that a member who has subscribed to a direct contribution scheme retires once 
the balance that is in their DC account is such that it can be able to replace at least two thirds of the current 
income that they are earning. The pension that is to be purchased by the member is calculated by dividing the 
accumulated pension wealth by a computed life annuity factor. The pension that is purchasable by the individual 
at a time (t) is calculated by multiplying the pension wealth that the individual has accumulated up to that 
particular time by a predetermined life annuity factor. The replacement ratio is computed using the following 
formula below as adopted from (MacDonald & Cairns, 2010). 
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Source: (MacDonald & Cairns, 2010). 
From the above model, we can conclude that the retirement age is determined by the wealth stock and the 
increase in the wealth stock beyond the normal growth level may promote the workers to retire early. If a 
worker’s wealth portfolio experiences super normal growth the worker may opt to retire if the wealth stock 
surpasses the 2/3 rd. criteria as defined by the two-thirds retirement Decision model (MacDonald & Cairns, 
2010). 
(b) The Option Value Retirement Decision Model: 
The option value model is a two-option comparison model that looks at two options when making pension 
retirement decision. The model proposes that there are two options that an individual with a DC pension looks at 
when making a decision of whether to retire or not. The first option is the choosing to continue working and the 
other option is the decision taken to retire from employment. Under this theory the worker uses intuition to 
decide which of the two option is more valuable.  
The worker under this model retires when it’s more valuable for them to retire. Some of the assumptions of the 
Option value model include; the retirement decision is evaluated each year by the workers with the pension plans 
to take into account new information that has become available over the past year. The individual who is 
considering retirement analyzes all the possibilities relating to the pension when making the decision to retire or 
not to retire. Some of the factors that the retirement decision is based on include; the current accumulated wealth 
stock, the current employment earnings, risk aversion related to the stability of their income levels, leisure desire 
of the employed individual and the annutization prices available in the market. 
(c) One Year Retirement Decision Model: 
The One Year retirement decision model and the option are similar in a way but the One-year retirement model 
only considers the benefits that are due to the worker over the next additional year. Under the one-year 
retirement model the retirement decision is made every year to take into account new information affecting the 
retirement decision that has become available. The decision whether to retire or not is made based on the 
analysis of the cost and benefits of both remaining in employment and retirement. This model only considers the 
one-year horizon when evaluating the future cost and benefits of remaining in employment of retiring. 
 
FORMS OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS PAYMENTS. 
There exist three main form of retirement benefit payment that can be used to pay pension benefits on retirement 
(Antolin, Pugh, & Stewart, 2008). The three forms of retirement payments include; Lump sum payment, 
Programmed withdrawals and life annuity benefit payment. 
(a) Lump sum Payment. 
Under the lump sum retirement benefit payment method, the retiree is paid the entire accumulated amount of the 
pension capital. The retirement benefit under this method is paid on attainment of the pensionable age or on the 
maturity of a retirement benefit plan that was set up as a savings retirement plan. Example of countries that have 
 
Where: 
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adopted the lump sum retirement benefit include; India, Hong Kong, Philippines and Thailand.  
(b) Programmed Withdrawals. 
Programmed Withdrawals retirement benefit payment entails the drawdown of the retirement benefit capital 
in a form of fixed of variable payments. The fixed and variable payments are drawn from the accumulated 
retirement benefit capital plus any extra return earned later by the retirement fund capital. Programmed 
withdrawal retirement benefit payment does not involve any longevity guarantees and are simple to 
calculate compared to the complex calculations involved in annuity retirement benefit payments. One 
common form of programmed retirement benefit payment is the annuity certain whereby the retirement 
benefit capital plus the interest earned is paid over a fixed period of time and the payments per each period 
are equal. 
(c) Life annuity. 
Life Annuity retirement benefit payment entails payment of the retirement capital through a stream of payments 
to the retiree as long as the retiree lives. The life annuity payments may also have additional guarantees whereby 
the benefits are paid to the surviving spouse even after the death of the retiree. The main advantage of the life 
annuity retirement benefit payment method is the fact that the benefits are fixed and are paid to the retiree for the 
remainder of their life after retirement. 
 
CONCLUSION 
According to the literature and in particular Baroni’s research (2007) and Karam, et al. (2010), pension reform 
can be analyzed from four approaches:  
A theoretical side: Using statistics to derive the ‘costs of negative population growth on different pension system 
designs and how different reforms can affect the cost rates as well as delivering the objectives set by these 
pension systems. 
A policy side: The focus here is on either reforming current pension systems based on empirically grounded 
beliefs such as the one relating to system funding to correct shortcoming associated with pension arrangements 
by shifting risks to individuals. 
Microsimulation modeling: This approach could provide a solution to the debate of the previous latter 
approaches by offering a methodology to assess the flaws and virtues of different reform proposals grounded in 
quantitative empirical analysis and computational power. More specifically, a microsimulation model can be 
used first to simulate income distribution under a given pension system (named static microsimulation); secondly 
to simulate future public and/or private pension accumulation and dissimulation over life cycle under a given 
pension scheme; and third to simulate effects of reforms to this given system on (life-cycle) income distribution 
and costs. Dynamin microsimulation is a tool for analyzing non-linear pension systems by simulating individual 
trajectories of heterogeneous economic agents over their life course.  
In the essence of these microsimulation models lies the ability to reproduce the demographic and economic 
composition of society, from the bottom up. Essentially the output is on entire distributions of key individual 
variables such as disposable income for the years to come although obviously, these distributions will be affected 
by underlying conditions such as demographic trends, or institutional rules which affect people´s transitions and 
behaviors. Dynamic microsimulation models are therefore valuable and have often been applied to pension 
analysis (e.g. Dupont, Hagnere’, Touze’, 2003; Flood, 2003, Curry, 1996) since they can provide with insights on 
the long-term impacts of pension reform apart from aggregate costs and financial sustainability, on individual 
pensioners´ welfare, future income and intra as well as inter-personal redistribution. In addition, these sorts of 
models allow to determine whether effects observed are caused by demographic or institutional changes, and 
finally compare also across systems and populations. It is therefore meaningful to employ microsimulation 
modelling to specific country contexts and reforms.  
GIMF’s Structure Model analysis: Drawing on research conducted by Karam, et al. (2010) an another 
interesting Model to consider as a framework for analyzing and evaluating the short and long run effects of 
planned pension policy actions that could inform this research is GIMF, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
model used inside the International Monetary Fund. Underlying the GIMF’s structure are key issues to analyze 
the positive effects of achieving fiscal sustainability in regards to aging and at the same time examine the 
normative aspects of adjusting public policies to changes in demographics.  
Karam, et al. (2010) cohort that the multi-country structure of GIMF allows to consider the impact of public 
pension reforms on investment decisions and an analysis of global interdependence and spillover effects. The 
GIMF makes use of an interwoven mixture of non-Ricardian features with a number of nominal and real 
adjustment costs to emphasize the potential interaction role of fiscal and monetary policies.  The model 
comprises of three groups of agents and sectors: households, firms, and the government (Karam, et al. 2010). 
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